I put forward a concise and intuitive formula for the calculation of the valuation for a good in the presence of the expectation that further, related, goods will soon become available. This valuation is tractable in the sense that it does not require the explicit resolution of the consumer's life-time problem.
Introduction
The literature on price determination generally treats an agent's valuation of an indivisible object as an exogenous parameter. But where does this value I thank Dan Friedman and Kohei Kawamura for their constructive comments. y School of Economics, 31 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9JT, Edinburgh, UK. E-mail:
Jozsef.Sakovics@ed.ac.uk come from? Let us make the brave assumption that the agent knows by how much his utility would increase relative to any given status quo in case he obtained the object. The question remains: How would a boundedly rational agent incorporate into his valuation the -positive or negative -synergies with other goods, which he might obtain later but consumes together with the object? We resolve that question in this note.
Consider the following scenario: our agent is about to participate in a trading mechanism where he can possibly obtain good A. The di¢ culty he faces is that there exists a good 1 B, which will become available later 2 and
is not want independent of A: the utility derived from owning A depends on whether or not the agent will own B as well. Of course, the ideal way to resolve this problem would be to make a joint decision on the purchase of A and B. However, it is often the case that this is not possible: at the time of the opportunity to buy A it may well be that the price (or even the availability) of B is not yet known to the agent, and as a result he cannot predict with certainty whether he will end up owning B.
Of course, an -impractical -alternative would be to solve the agent's entire stochastic life-time problem. Barring that, surprisingly, a tractable solution to this basic problem is not known within the standard context of consumer choice. The reason for that is the straight jacket imposed on us by the universally accepted view of the consumer problem (due to Hicks and Allen, 1934), which frames it as utility maximization subject to a budget constraint: even if -and this is a big if -our agent knew his budget for buying A and B; he would only be able to satisfy his budget constraint in 1 To simplify the equations, we consider a single alternative good. The generalization to many di¤erent potential baskets is straightforward. 2 For simplicity, we do not model uncertainty over the time when B becomes available, and also assume no discounting.
expectation, which would generically lead to an ex post suboptimal decision. 3 Recently, Friedman and Sákovics (2014) developed an alternative model of tractable consumer choice. 4 It is based on the Marshallian concept of the marginal utility of money, , de…ned as the slope of the life-time indirect utility function evaluated at the current wealth (and forgoing the current shopping opportunity). According to them, the pecuniary connection between current and future choices is a trade-o¤ rather than a (budget) constraint, andthat can be learned and/or approximated -is the measure of it. Crucially, need not be updated in between a series of small purchases. Thus, instead of framing the consumer's problem as max u(x) subject to p x m; they advocate max u(x) p x: A nice thing about the resulting quasi-linear utility is that it is well suited to handle a probabilistic problem as above.
Before turning to the model with multiple goods, it is worthwhile to pon- which are want independent from any other goods: de…ning a subproblem for which can be considered constant.
The above decomposition of v into a utility factor, u(A) u(0), and a value of money factor, , has useful consequences. For example, we can endogenize v without requiring the consumer to change her taste (u(:)). In 3 See Sákovics (2011) for a model where the budget constraint is "satis…ed" for a misperceived, and therefore incorrect, (but …xed) price, also leading to an ex post under-or overspend. 4 For the corresponding theory of revealed preference see Sákovics (2013) .
other words, we can make willingness to pay dependent on the circumstances -such as reference prices -maintaining the object's utility value, and hence the agent's welfare, unchanged. Previously, in order to introduce welfare neutral distortions, researchers needed to resort to an "as if"approach, where it was counterfactually assumed that it was the perception of prices that was distorted. 5 Using the demand function developed by Friedman and Sákovics
(2014), all we need is a discrete change in to achieve the same behavior without interfering with welfare. We are now ready express the conditional purchasing probabilities as functions of the exogenous parameters:
The main result and its derivation
and E(p B jB; A) =
: Pulling everything together, we have
Note that the last three terms of (1) can be interpreted as the result of integration by parts. "Reverse integrating"them we obtain our main result: Proposition 1. The valuation for good A before the agent learns the price of good B is given by
The …rst term is the straightforward valuation that the agent would have if he knew that good B was not available (or if A and B were want independent). The second term captures the interdependence between A and B. The size of the additional e¤ect depends on the distribution of p B : The more likely it is that p B is low -say, in terms of …rst-order stochastic dominance of the distribution functions -the more likely it is that B will be bought and the more it a¤ects the valuation for A: In the extreme case, when the agent is certain that he will buy good B, F B (v The other side of the same coin is to see that when the purchase of A is not a separable subproblem, a "virtual income e¤ect"comes into play even with quasi-linear utilities.
Conclusion
In this note we have derived the valuation for a good at a time when the conditions under which another, related, good will be available are not yet known. The su¢ cient statistic for the rest-of-life problem was the marginal utility for money, which can be learned and/or estimated. This result can be interpreted as a tractable micro-foundation for using a valuation as a parameter in these circumstances.
